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Introduction 
Canada's federal Department of Communications is charged with developing 
public policy for both 1) the cultural industries, including broadcasting, and 2) tele- 
communications, within the same planning compass. When, as is now occurring, tele- 
communications and computing are blended into a single frontierless technology 
manifold, and when, as well, the latter is in turn increasingly integrated into the crea- 
tive arts, the issuance of a major discussion paper by the Department is bound to be a 
significant event. After all, the Department is getting on for its twentieth anniversary 
and the TeleCommission report Instant World, remarkable in its time, has been in 
many respects overtaken by the intervening technological evolution. We are accord- 
ingly within our rights in expecting a historic document: a fresh look at the present 
and, if a title means anything, a bold new vision of the future. This is not quite what 
we are offered. Instead, the paper which has been issued is deeply flawed and, more 
importantly, its flaws index a national dilemma in policy making. 
"Communications For The lkenty-First Century" 
Let me begin with a brief (and impressionistic) r&umt of the discussion paper's 
content. For a country of disparate regions and vast expanses such as Canada, the 
maintenance of its communicational infrastructure is essential--indeed asine qua non- 
-to its continued existence as a nation. While we have historically met this challenge, 
the paper points to present danger signals: 1) a weak information producing industry, 
2) a fragmented set of jurisdictional arrangements in tele communications which 
makes the reform of the system, in spite of the need, inordinately difficult, 3) a cer- 
tain national conservatism in the take-up of new technologies and 4) a thin and under- 
funded research effort. Given this assessment of our weaknesses, the paper focuses 
on four kinds of industry: 1) information producers/marketers, 2) networks, 3) users 
and 4) research agencies. 
The traditional "infomation industries", as the report defines them, include pub- 
lishing, broadcasting, film, video and sound recording (with revenues of $11 billion 
in 1985). To these are added two new categories which the report makes much of, i.e. 
the "contents of computer memories, which are commonly called databases", and 
packaged software. The information industries, it is claimed, regularly outstrip the 
rest of the economy in revenue growth, and, not surprisingly therefore, "information 
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workers", in the broadest sense of the term, now make up more than fifty per cent of 
the labor force. Here is the rub: while the telecommunications and electronic data 
processing industry as a whole has grown as rapidly in Canada as elsewhere, much of 
that mwth, when one looks a bit closer (although this is never made quite clear in the 
paper), takes the form of a negative contribution to our balance-of-trade. What we 
buy in the way of technology, it turns out, we tend to buy from abroad. Our "informa- 
tion industry", inasmuch as we may want to equate that term with commercial data- 
bases and packaged software, is so weakly developed, in spite of some honourable 
exceptions, as to be practically nonexistent. 
When we think telecommunications, traditionally, we call to mind message traf- 
fic (telephone calls, data exchange, telexes, facsimile transmission) and not-for-broad- 
castprogramme delivery systems. The discussion paper argues, with conviction, that 
the evolutionary pattern of information development and use is putting severe strains 
on the established set of arrangements which characterize the Canadian system. The 
system has traditionally been predicated on two long standing principles: 1) telecom- 
munications constitutes a kind of natural monopoly and 2) there is a clear conceptual 
distinction between the carrier of messages (the monopoly part, and hence subject to 
regulation) and their content (which is by its nature unregulatable). To these two over- 
riding "axiomatic" principles, one could perhaps add a third of almost equal impor- 
tance (in Canada, at least), namely that networks responsible for local and 
long-distance traffic must be treated as \one coherent system, the regulation of tariffs, 
with its implications of regional disparities, being as much a political as an economic 
problem. 
These basic principles no longer look quite as "basic" as they once did. What with 
satellites already available in profusion, and the accelerating introduction of fibre o p  
tics, telephone lines and cable installations are no longer the only game in town, and 
in the United States, as a result of what is euphemistically called "deregulation" (it is 
really re-regulation), the customer now has a choice of competing systems, for long- 
distance traffic. Similarly, the development of what are called "value-added services" 
has, as the discussion paper points out, blurred the distinction between content and 
carrier: you may want to subscribe to a complete financial network, or education net- 
work, or health network, or agricultural information network (the examples which are 
mentioned in the report) or indeed any other specialized network of combined com- 
munication and information processing functions, merchandised as a complete pack- 
age and not available to the general subscriber as part of the basic service. 
In the United States, a sequence of events involving Congress, the FCC (the 
Federal Communications Commission) and the courts, and culminating in a critical 
court divestiture decision, resulted in the 1984 breakup of the American giant, AT&T 
(the old "Ma Bell"), into, on the one hand, a new AT&T dedicated to long-haul traf- 
fic, in competition with other long-distance transmission companies (MCI, US Sprint) 
and, on the other, seven regionally based companies, known as "Baby Bells", who take 
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care of most of the local traffic (along with companies such as GTE). While the issue 
of the precise benefits and inconveniences flowing from deregulation remains contro- 
versial? it & clear that, overall, the volume of traffic has been stimulated (with result- 
ing scale effects) and the development of innovative business services promoted. The 
reform of the American system puts, in turn, pressure on policy-makers in Canada to 
extend competition here as well. 
No agency in Canada, including the DoC, has the clout to move unilaterally to a 
comparable reform of the system. Jurisdiction over telecommunications in Canada is 
fractured into a mosaic of public and private, federal and provincial, without any easi- 
ly visible underlying logic. As a result, there has been no similar opening up to new 
services and to competition. Policy reform proceeds at a snail's pace, and given the 
post-Meech Lake atmosphere, there is little likelihood of any important breakthrough 
in the near f u t ~ r e . ~  There are potential negative effects of this immobility: the risk is 
that the greater spectrum of services now offered south of the border will put the 
Canadian system at a disadvantage in attracting corporate customers, some of whom 
are already discovering the advantages of establishing a short-haul link with an Ameri- 
can border point and routing even their message traffic destined for other points in 
Canada through the American system. 
According to the DoC paper, the business issue presented by the new technologies 
can be summed up in a single word: automation. Automation, we are told , is "well 
advanced" in North America and most OECD countries. Mind you, automation is 
costly, it has proven surprisingly difficult to implement ("...more difficult and compli- 
cated than anticipated..."), its benefits are elusive (" ... automated factories have proven 
less efficient and productive than their less automated counterparts...") and its contri- 
bution to national competitiveness is suspect ("...there is growing evidence that 
productivity is a management problem, not a technological question..."). Never mind: 
the real issue, we soon learn, is elsewhere, namely the "sluggishness" with which busi- 
ness in Canada has adopted office and process automation: "Canada's persistent lag 
in information technology diffusion is a serious problem of national proportions. The 
diffusion of these technologies is too slow." We have, apparently, a cultural deficien- 
cy: "We do not have a culture that promotes the use of new technology." 
Outside of automation, we are presented with a short shopping list of isolated in- 
stances of creative uses of the technology by dedicated and gifted individuals to solve 
local problems in telemedicine and teleeducation. There is no evidence as to the over- 
all pattern of technology use in Canada. 
The section on research is a rehearsal of material which anyone familiar with the 
Canadian context knows well: we stack up badly with our international competitors 
in the matter of research (barely ahead of Austria and Finland on a per capita basis) 
and, furthermore, our performance is deteriorating, comparatively speaking. Although 
telecommunications is an honorable exception to this rule, in that Bell Canada, Mite1 
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and B.C. Telephone have invested heavily in research, and companies such as IBM 
Canada and Xerox have located laboratories here, we still lag far behind our internat- 
ional competitors. Unlike Japan, the United States and the European countries, there 
has been no concerted national effort in Canada to develop a progmmme in areas such 
as artificial intelligence, superconductivity, high-definition television, computerized 
graphics, parallel processing computer technologies, etc. The Department's own re- 
search programme has been drained of resources in recent years (a process that had 
already begun under the last Liberal government and has, if anything, accelerated 
under the Conservatives); "...since the end of the Telidon program in 1985," we are in- 
formed in a tone of admirable understatement, "Communications Canada's research 
activities have been oriented primarily toward the needs of clients in the Department 
and other federal government departments."4 
The Image On Which The Paper Is Constructed 
In this section I present what I conceive to be the Department's underlying image 
of informatics, its relationship to telecommunications and the policy alternatives 
which now confront us. I argue that 1) if we credit the image as being accurate, then 
the policy questions which are thrown up are in fact rather different than those which 
are stated (in other words, the paper lacks internal validity) and 2) the image itself is 
seriously flawed (the paper also fails, in other terms, on grounds of external validity). 
Figure 1 shows graphically what we take to be this underlying image. 
Figure 1 
The Underlying Conception of the Discussion Paper 
new telecom sews 
"grey" area: 
value-added services 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 13, NO. 3&4 67 
In this conception, there used to be two autonomous domains, one called the "in- 
formation industries" (publishing, broadcasting, film, video and sound recording) the 
other called "telecommunications" (telephony, telegraphy, telex, facsimile, data trans- 
mission). Each had its own technology and practices, its own institutional ar- 
rangements, its own dominant organizations, with relatively little overlap between the 
two universes. The two distinct domains constituted the two principal areas of respon- 
sibility of the Department of Communication. The policy issues thrown up by the two 
sectors have traditionally been quite different: in the information industries, the 
problem is how to sustain a set of fragile national industries, whose economic viability 
can never be taken for granted, given the openness of our frontiers and the reality of 
ever-present foreign competition (for which one can usually read "American"). In the 
field of telecommunications, where a Canadian monopoly could be guaranteed by fiat, 
if not by fact, the issues have been ones of equity, since the telecoms have been im- 
mensely profitable and have even (in the case of Northern Telecom) proved themsel- 
ves quite capable of holding their own in international competition. To simplify, the 
Department saw itself, in the first instance, with its hand on the throttle, and in the sec- 
ond, with its foot on the brake. 
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Technological change is now complicating this idyllic situation: the neat division 
3e world is becoming messy as a result of such things as on-line databases, value- 
led services and digitization of telecommunications. On the one hand, the technol- 
es of telecommunications and the information industries (including computing) 
re become indistinguishable; on the other, the conceptual distinction between con- 
t and carrier, in a world where artificial intelligence, in the form of software, is 
cribed into the hardware network, no longer applies so well. 
The problems, as the Department defines them, are accordingly the following: 1) 
"new" information industries (on-line databases, packaged software, such as 
~cational material) are weak in Canada and should now be added to the list of cul- 
11 domains to be actively fostered (departmental policy-making Mandate # l), 2) 
titutional arrangements governing telecommunications have been slow to meet the 
v situation with the result that Canadian enterprise is in danger of being discouraged 
I an opportunity for innovation and growth missed (departmental Mandate # 2). 3) 
ladians generally are not picking up on the new technology as quickly as they 
luld (a kind of unofficial mandate of prophet and promoter of the new technologies), 
14) we are failing to invest in the development of further new technologies, through 
m h ,  at a level which would allow us to keep pace with our international competi- 
; (Mandate # 3 of the Department, and the only one where its role is outright opera- 
Ell). 
How we are to deal with these problems is much less clear. On the first of the is- 
s, we are admonished that "...we must significantly strengthen our database indus- 
' and "...we must ensure the future vitality of the packaged software industry" but 
paper is unenlightening as to how these most admirable goals are to be achieved 
68 Twenty-First Century in the Rear View MirrorIJ. Taylor 
other, presumably, than by an extension of present departmental programmes a p  
plicable to the older, more conventional fields. On the question of telecommunica- 
tions policy, we are enjoined to be patient and to have faith in the on-going 
federal-provincial negotiations. As for applications, the Department would plug into 
regional development programmes by the promotion of delivery systems for health 
and education. On the issue of research, the paper lapses back into its wistful mood 
of hoping against hope that somewhere out there there must be an embryonic infor- 
matics industry into which the Department's research programme could be plugged. 
The Problem Of Internal Validity 
Let us turn to the problem of internal validity. To begin with, consider what the 
paper says (or rather, does not say) about databases. Suppose we start by taking the 
paper at its own word: databases are a significant new phenomenon in our society; 
they generate important revenues; we should, as a nation, be strongly represented in 
this new commercial sector. This is a plausible enough argument, on the face of it, 
except that it ignores one salient fact: most databases are not for sale at all, and are 
certainly not available to the general public! The services for sale (the "information 
industries") are just the tip of the iceberg. Most databases are managed as privileged 
property, with the equivalent of "Do Not Trespass!" signs posted everywhere you look. 
Look a bit more closely at some of those new databases. For example, policemen 
now have immediate access to a vast network of electronic information sources. Why 
should this be a matter of concern? The answer is that isolated facts are one thing; 
interpretation is another. These databases not only allow the forces responsible for 
public security to information; they also permit the construction, through infer- 
ence, of personal profiles. You might not agree with the reasoning processes employ- 
ed to create a profile of you (assuming that you knew about them, that is) nor about 
the conclusions at which the reasoners arrive, but you will in any case never have the 
luxury of contesting them, because they are not accessible. Such profiles can be used 
to solve crimes; they provide clues to recurrent patterns of behavior. They could, of 
course, be used for less benign purposes: to classify your political beliefs, for exam- 
ple, or to exclude you from a position to which you aspired (without your ever know- 
ing why your candidature had been rejected) or to prevent you from visiting a certain 
country. These databases put immense power in the hands of a few individuals, and, 
in Canada, without any very clear set of laws to govern the use of them. The poten- 
tial for abuse is real: the need to develop legislation has, for example, been recognized 
by practically every European country. 
These kinds of databases are not just used by police forces, or by the tax collec- 
tion departments of governments, or by the immigration service. There & an industry 
out there, based on databases, but not quite like the one described in the discussion 
paper. It again exploits massive quantities of accumulated data about ordinary people 
- & They can be built up in quite simple ways, by following,for example, your 
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ttems of credit card purchases. These mushrooming clandestine databases have 
en written up by a magazine not usually associated with radical positions, Business 
?ek? people denied access to housing on the basis of confidential databases, whose 
&rial was based, not on fact, but on hearsay, or denied access to credit because of 
ilt by association. Business Week's point is that there is no established set of canons 
responsible business practice covering the operation of these intelligence service* 
: sale, but not to everyone. 
There are other questions involved, such as the location of these databases, which 
ntain information about Canadian events and people. When the Montreal Gazette 
jorted the sequence of events following a disastrous fire which put the main com- 
ter of a large Quebec food merchandiser out of operation, it included the story of a 
;h company official crossing the border in the middle of the night, carrying com- 
ter tapes, on his way to the company's database in New Jersey. Does it matter that 
much of our data is stored in the United States? Possibly yes, possibly no. Our pur- 
se here is not to argue the pros and cons of this, or any other database-related ques- 
a, but simply to observe the total absence in the DOC dkcusswn paper of a very 
ye set of questions about the potential for abuse of databases, which has been re- 
gnized as an important issue of public policy in Europe and is admitted as a mat- 
of concern by responsible business leaders in America. 
Let us turn to another curious omission in the paper. According to the chapter 
~ich deals with the users of communications technology, the big payoffs will come 
bm automation, which will improve both manufacturing productivity and ad- 
nistrative performance. I will not dwell here on the results of an accumulating body 
evidence, compiled internationally (and which includes, incidentally, the results of 
: Department's own assessment programme of its office communication systems ui- 
I), which shows with surprising clarity that the technology, in and of itself, has no 
rticular impact on performance, either positive or negative, other than that which 
n be explained by factors of managerial practice. Let us ignore this evidence, 
wever, and let us suppose for the moment that the paper is right, and that automa- 
n is the answer to many of our administrative and manufacturing problems. Auto- 
ttion, by definition, succeeds by substituting machinew for people. The implication 
zlear: if we were really to succeed in making automation work, the result would be 
:onsiderable disruption of the labor market! Yet this effect of technological imple- 
:ntation is never mentioned in the paper.6 
Fortunately, I think the paper is quite mistaken in its assumption about the way 
:hnology is integrated into the workplace. Whatever is happening, it does not much 
emble the pattern which was predicted at the beginning of the decade--neither 
roductivity gains" (for which, read "personnel cuts") nor massive layoffs. However, 
r purpose here once again is not to argue the pros and cons of the transformation of 
:work place but the absence of any reference in the workingpaper to the human 
70 Twenty-First Century in the Rear View MirrorJJ. Taylor 
dimension, even though questions of worker displacement are implied by its own ar- 
guments in support of automation. 
Consider a third example of the bias of the paper. Communications and informa- 
tion technology, we are informed, "...if properly deployed and used," can assist in the 
development of Canada's regions. "It is here that the 'distance-insensitive' character 
of the technology offers the greatest potential for revitalizing traditional industries and 
creating new opportunities." The problem, it seems, lies in provincial regulatory 
regimes that are more restrictive than those in federal territories, and which have the 
effect of limiting "...the range of equipment and services available in the western and 
eastern provinces in comparison with those offered in Ontario, Quebec and British 
Columbia." It follows that: "...information-intensive firms will be reluctant to locate 
in regions that do not offer a competitive range of communications services, while the 
information-based f m s  that are already there will operate at a competitive disad- 
vantage" (p. 74). We must therefore ensure that "...advanced communications 
facilities continue to develop in all parts of the country at more or less comparable 
rates." 
I have no quarrel with this argument either, as far as it goes: access to communi- 
cation is an essential component of the competitiveness of a modem enterprise. But 
there is another side to the coin. The thing about a highway (and this applies as much 
to electronic highways as to any other kind) is that the traffic it opens up is bidirec- 
tional. It is perfectly true that this means someone in Moosejaw, or Rimouski, or Syd- 
ney can more easily access the great metropolitan centres, and this represents, from 
the local perspective, an enhancement of competitive advantage. But it is equally me 
that someone in Toronto, or Vancouver, or Montreal (or New York, or Chicago, or Los 
Angeles, let us not forget) can more easily access the smaller town. "Insensitivity to 
distance" is a sword which cuts two ways. In assessing the potential impact of in- 
novation in communications on regional viability, it is therefore imperative to keep in 
mind questions of comparative competitive advantage. It is possible, of course, that 
some little bank in Orillia could grow to national status because of the outreach which 
better telecommunications provided; it is probable that the large existing central banks 
will find their hold on towns like Orillia consolidated. It is possible that a small 
publisher of specialized material located in Fredericton can use the opening up of the 
communications network to reach a world market (and in fact I know of such a case); 
it is probable that the great publishers in New York and Paris will extend their open- 
tions into new and more profitable areas. It is possible for a successful broker to work 
out of Wawa in the wilds of Ontario (an instance cited in the discussion paper); it is 
probable that the stock markets of the entire world will be stitched together into one 
immense seamless system, with the scale of large, international brokerage operations 
reaching unheard of dimensions. When Wall Sueet grows; Wawa shrinks-relatively. 
The most elementary kind of logical analysis tells us that the very large centres 
of the world have two inherent built-in advantages over the small: variety and scale. 
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:ause they draw to them the products of the entire world, the metropolitan centers 
ome leaders of style: customers tend to prefer the kshness (for them) of the metro- 
itan import to the staleness (again for them) of the traditional local? This is the ad- 
tage of variety. And because they supply a larger market, they can exploit 
nomies of scale to produce goods and services at a more competitive price. Thus 
mvements in communication give a built-in natural advantage to the metropolitan 
ter over the local and regional. Not that this is an inflexible rule: history is replete 
h instances where the little region used its skill in communications to transform it- 
' into a global power. It is just that the odds are against it. What improved com- 
liicatiens does is to make it more probable that the region will become increasingly 
endent on the metropolis, and that smaller nations will become branch plant 
nomies, functioning at the margin of the larger. To reverse this pattern is perfectly 
sible, providing the circumstances are right. but reversals are not the natural course 
hings, which is what the paper would have us suppose. They are the swial  case. 
In all this paper, you will find no reference to the fact that, since the publication 
nstant World, that most messianic of technology prognostications, regional dis- 
ities have not noticeably diminishedand, even more shocking from an economic 
nt of view, technology spending in Canada has contributed negatively to our 
znce-of-trade, to the point where we now face an annual shortfall in the high- 
I sector of many billions of dollars. In other words, there is an unaddressed issue, 
just of regional competitiveness, but of national competitiveness. When all of these 
~ssions are added up, a picture begins to take form. It is a picture in which only the 
itive is accentuated. Whenever quite real and possible negative human and social 
cts of the computerization of communications are concerned, there is deafening 
nce. The end-result of such unrelenting optimism is to make the paper read as if 
ad been put out by the PR department of a large technology firm--a curious posi- 
I for a Department of Communications in a nation with such a weak electronics and 
ware manufacturing industry to protect.8 The sociological dimension is not simp 
nderplayed; it is absent (other than in the occasional rhetorical flourish)? The result 
distortion of perspective--a distortion which comes from ignoring the inevitably 
:ximinatory impact of change in a society where there are already discrepancies: 
onal, occupational, ethnic, sexual, educational, which, cumulatively, mean une- 
I opportunity to benefit from innovation when it comes. To ignore these discrepan- 
is to create a trap for oneself: which translates into indiscriminate technology 
h. 
Technology Implementation as a Meta-Problem: "A Problem Which 
Cannot Now be Addressed" (The Problem of External Validity) 
Michel Chevalier of York University and the Universiv5 de Montrkl has written 
nsivel on what he calls "meta-problems" or "problems which cannot now be ad- 
18  ised". What he means by a meta-problem is one which cannot easily be cir- 
scribed within the established sectoral domain of some existing institution. 
72 Twenty-First Century in the Rear View MirrorlJ. Taylor 
Problems of the environment, which are what he has been most preoccupied with in 
his professional career, tend to fall into this category: they spill over municipal, pro- 
vincial and national boundaries; they have all kinds of functional ramifications--xien- 
tific, industrial, agricultural, employment. They are hard to break down into neat 
compartments; they resist easy analysis. They are often associated in our minds with 
dramatic--even catastrophic--change, yet we find it hard to focus on them, either con- 
ceptually or in the form of concrete action. 
The technological transformation which we are now undertaking is of this order. 
It is a mta-problem. On this point, we can do no better than quote the DOC discus- 
sion paper itself: 
Like all industrialized countries, Canada is in the midst of a profound shift 
in the foundations of its economic and social life .... As a steady stream of 
government reports and popular bestsellers has told us, we are rapidly 
becoming an information-based society. Most observers agree that this shift 
is of comparable historical significance to our earlier transition from an 
agricultural to an industrial society. Underlying this shift is a new 
communications inErastructure which is as important to the information age 
as were rivers, railways, and highways to earlier eras. It is made up of 
machines for creating, storing and exchanging information .... These 
machines are tied together by complex telecommunications networks, the 
central nervous system of the information society. In recognition of the role 
these machines and networks will play in Canada's future, the Science 
Council has called this new computer-based communications infrastructure 
a transformative technology, and has stated that it will have the greatest 
impact of all emerging technologies on societal change between now and the 
end of the century. 
Communications for the twenty-first century, p. 6 
Emphasis added] 
The term "transformative technology" is employed both in the introductory and 
the closing chapters of the discussion paper, but not exploited in the substantive sec- 
tions of the essay. Defining a "transformative" technology is of course not easy but 
on one point it seems to me there would be general agreement: transformative implies 
non-linear. That is to say, whatever it is that makes a phenomenon "transformative", 
it must include the sense of a break, a rupture with previous trends (or as the mathe- 
maticians might put it, a change of parameters). To be transformed is to change one's 
phase space (in the language of engineering), by which is meant that the kinds of 
responses, the sorts of behavior, the varieties of policy, which were appropriate to 
yesterday's world may not any longer be adequate. It is at this point that the most 
profound inconsistency in the discussion paper appears: while it says, explicitly, and 
in so many words, that the new technology is transformative, it asserts, in all its 
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analysis of problems and how to respond to them, that the old policies will do, even 
though they may need a little fine-tuning: databases are just a new kind of informa- 
tion industry, to be tucked in with the old; value-added services are really just a new 
kind of telecommunications function, which the old system can incorporate by a little 
bit of change here and there: "...the evolutionary approach of Japan and the United 
Kingdom rather than the more radical U.S. line." The effect is to reduce the issues of 
communication in the information society to a sectoral problem: rather than being seen 
as a meta-problem, constrained within the saait-jacket of a departmental mandate. 
What I would like to do now is to take the idea of "transfornative" seriously and ask 
in what sense, if these technologies really are transformative, we might need to revise 
our ideas about how to develop public policy. We will explore, in other words, the 
sense in which it is legitimate to think of the transition to an information society as a 
meta-problem . 
Communication and the Question of Scale 
Scale 
The question we are asking ourselves here is simply this: "In what sense are the 
new communication and information-processing technologies transformative?" The 
answer is quite simply, I believe, that they alter the scale of things. A "scale" is simp- 
ly the means by which we measure something (its etymological origin relates the word 
to the concept of steps). There are two kinds of scale, those by which we measure 
space and those by which we measure time. When we claim that a technology is "trans- 
formative" in its effect, we mean not just that the radius within which we function, in 
space and in time, is changing, but something a bit more radical: the scales by which 
we measure things are themselves undergoing change. 
That the concept of "scale" is itself relative is very much the product of develop- 
ments which have taken place (and are now taking place) in intellectual spheres of the 
twentieth century, particularly in modem physics and mathematics. Our contemporary 
popular occidental notions of scale are historically rooted in the technology of an ear- 
lier period: we measure time by the revolution of the hands of the clock, space by the 
revolution of the circumference of the wheel and ideas by the linear standards of the 
printing press. While these images still hold a powerful grip on our imagination, their 
theoretical basis has now been fatally eroded. 
Consider the following finding: there is no ultimate scale for measuring spatial 
extent. Nature, as far as we can tell, is essentially fractal:" no matter what level we 
meet it on, its processes seem recursive, by which we mean that processes encountered 
at one level of observation and analysis re-appear at quite different levels, when we 
increase the power of magnification (to either the very small, as in quantum physics, 
or very large, as in astronomical systems). Until this century, it could be believed that 
there existed one basic, non-divisible level of reality (atom, electron, quark, or 
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whatever), out of which, by processes of composition, all more complex matter could 
be built up. The whole metric system of measurement incorporates this view of an 
elementary substratum: a fundamental scale provided by Nature from which all our 
secondary measures could be derived. It is this assumption of one elementary stand- 
ard which has been irrevocably shattered, with consequences which we have hardly 
yet begun to grasp, but which extend far beyond physics. 
What we now know is that the determination of "scale" cannot be made indepen- 
dently of the "scaler": scale is not there, present in Nature, independently of some o b  
server, but in the interaction between Nature and the observer. What determines, in 
turn, the interaction between man, the observer, and Nature, depends on the commun- 
icational means at the disposition of the former, for it is in the nature of communica- 
tion that it determines how man experiences Nature. When people walked, Nature 
was measured by the number of paces stepped; when they rode, we moved to miles. 
We measure time in the same way, by those crucial boundaries of our own waking and 
sleeping lives (hours and days) and by the revolutions of objects that are apparent to 
our unaided senses (months and years). 
The Bias of Communication 
It was an idea of Harold Innis that every communication technology has a built- 
in bias, in that it creates its own scale by which to measure the extent of things, either 
in time or in space. What Innis also perceived is that the flourishing of the institutions 
of a society reflects directly the operation of the scalar principle: theocracies (in our 
contemporary world, the universities and the intellectual community) span time; na- 
tions and empires (in our time, multinationals) span space. The combined reach, over 
time and space, determines the available frontiers for future growth of human institu- 
tions-- the practical limits of power, if one prefers the latter manner of thinking. 
Societies exist in immanence before they exist in fact. 
When we introduce new communication technologies which seriously affect our 
perception of the scale of things, then we have also created the underlying condition 
for spontaneous, institutional evolution. Technologies do not, in and of themselves. 
determine social structures, but they make things possible that were not possible 
before. They change, in other words, the parameters. From this we are led to ask about 
the new technologies: what is (or, more properly, "are", since we are in fact talking, 
not about g technology, but about a family of technologies) their inherent bias(es)? 
There are, it seems to me, two answers (corresponding to the two poles of the technol- 
ogy, telecommunications and computing). The first bias is, to employ the language of 
the paper, to reduce our "sensitivity" to distance. Practically speaking, this is to say 
that many people (not all) have come to take for granted wearing what used to be 
seven-league boots, our radius of communication vastly extended. Translated into an 
institutional reality, this implies the emergence of an integrated world economy. It no 
longer means anything significant to claim, for example, that a company such as 
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Northern Telecom is "Canadian": 4 the big f m s  of today (and a surprising number 
of the smaller) are multinationals. The financial universe of today, likewise, is global, 
no longer constrained within the boundaries of any single country. Big money owes 
allegiance to no nation. 
Were the discussion paper to have addressed the implications of this bias of the 
new technologies, it would have had to do something which neither it, nor the Tele- 
commission, was prepared to contemplate: the situation of Canada within an interna- 
tional context Communications for the Twenty-first Century, like its predecessor, 
Instant World, prefers to talk about communications in Canada as if they stopped at 
the border! Nowhere in this present discussion paper will you find any reference to 
the increasing integration of Canada into international networks. Nowhere, in other 
words, are issues of national sovereignty to be discovered and since the issue is never 
raised, we cannot, accordingly, ask how best to sustain our identity in a world whose 
frontiers are less geographical than social and economic. It cannot then occur to us, 
therefore, that the problems of our manufacturing industries are not so much due to an 
invasion of off-she competitors as the exportation of their operations by our own 
companies. 12 
It is almost impossible to pick up a business magazine these days without being 
reminded of the trend to globalization (Fortune, March 14,1988; U.S. News & World 
Report, March 7, 1988), that is in large part attributable to advances in telecom- 
munications and computing technologies, which lower transactional costs for interna- 
tional trade, lead to global strategies for business, in particular manufacturing, and 
have resulted in an integrated financial marketplace. 
Globalization creates spectacular opportunities for some enterprises, simply be- 
cause the size of the market is so much greater. Canadian f m s  with the right kind of 
products to sell, and the right kind of management, will prosper as never before. On 
the other hand, globalization opens up competition, and removes protections. The ef- 
fects of this sudden permeability are nowhere to be felt so strongly as in the labor 
marker the North American worker finds him- and herself today in direct competition 
with labor in other countries, prepared to work for less remuneration and less security 
of employ. The same thing applies to regional industries, which now face the buffet- 
ing of a competitive storm, international in its reach. The textile industry illustrates 
the pattern: as a manufacturing sector, it is in trouble, yet Dominion Textiles prospers, 
precisely because it has itself become international in its scope. This is the 
phenomenon of globalization, mention of which is nowhere to be found in the DOC 
paper- 
The other bias of the new communication technologies has also to do with scale, 
but in a different way: the scale of operations of a single work unit or individuaL It 
is what has been called the "augmentation" effect of personal computing. The mod- 
em computer user may have little idea of the science of computing. Instead, the new 
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applications software furnishes a tool by which the otherwise unaided individual can 
accomplish what used to take a small army of clerks to do. The spreadsheet provides 
a manageable view of the operations of quite a complicated enterprise; the desktop 
publishing system liberates the writer from many of the past constraints of the manu- 
facture of documents; computer-aided design makes available to the engineer and the 
architect something like the equivalent of a drafting department; the mini-supercom- 
puter 3-dimensional graphic workstations are altering the scale of scientific research. 
(It cannot be emphasized too strongly how recent these developments are: a 
phenomenon of the eighties--the past five years, in fact.) 
The total effect of this change of cognitive scale is to give the small-to-medium 
enterprise the power to manage operations and to process data which used to require 
the setting up of a large establishment. Let us now put these two "biases" of the com- 
munication technologies together. We should expect to find the growth of new 
organizations beginning to manifest certain characteristics: 1) to be globalistic in their 
orientation, 2) to be smaller than previously, even while manoeuvering in more com- 
plex environments, and 3) to be skilled in management and what might be called 
"intellectual services". We should also expect these effects to be recent. All of these 
predictions are confirmed by recent analyses. David Birch (1987) calls the trend which 
we have just described the "atomization" of America: "Neglected amid much of the 
talk about our economy's changes ... is a simple and underlying statistical fact the 
American economy is breaking into pieces. More and smaller businesses now do what 
fewer and larger ones did before. Our economy is 'atomizing*. "I3 In 1985, he points 
out, 700,000 new companies were formed in the United States (compared with 200,000 
in 1965; 90,000 in 1950). To these we can add 400,000 new partnerships and 300,000 
newly self-employed people, for a total of 1.4 million new enterprises created in that 
year alone (about the same as the number of total private-sector jobs created in the 
same year). This degree of atomization, Birch argues, is a relatively new phenomenon 
(basically, when charted against the GNP, since the mid-1970's) and represents "...a 
major structural change in the way America does business." It coincides with 1) the 
decline of agricultural jobs (now only 2% of employment), 2) the decrease in impor- 
tance of manufacturing as a source of employment (9% of the work force is actually 
to be found in factories although the percentage usually quoted for manufacturing is 
closer to 20%) and 3) the flattening out of employment trends in wholesaling and re- 
tailing (down to just under 25% from its earlier level of about 27%), 4) a decline in 
those working in construction (about 5%). 5) stability in the numbers employed in 
transportation, communications and other utilities, and 5) growth in finance, insurance 
and real estate (to about lo%, from about 5% a couple of decades before). It is the 
service industry which has exploded: (from 15% of the work force in 1%0 to almost 
40% in 1985). Large companies are getting smaller: 2.2 million fewer people worked 
for the Fortune 500 companies in 1985 than in 1980. Between 1970 and 1981, about 
30% of Fortune 500 companies had vanished. Start-up companies are smaller.14 
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TheInstitute for the ~uture" hasanalyzed datagoing back to 1970 which shows 
that the percentage of employment accounted for by the Fortune 500 companies in the 
U.S. has dropped from 18.1% in 1970 to a predicted 11.6% by 1990, and should level 
out at approximately 10.4% by the year 2000. It is the big companies which make and 
sell things, while the rest of the economy is involved in creating and trading in- 
formation, servicing each other and supporting the flow of goods. There is an impor- 
tant side-effect of this change. The smaller f m s ,  now the predominate model of 
enterprise, are, the Institute points out, footloose: fired from locational dependence 
on an immobile resource base, and no longer constrained within a heavy transports- 
tional infrastructure, they follow people, and their choice of location depends on fac- 
tors that used to be secondary: availability of communications, proximity of 
educational institutions which form the cadres of the future, climate and the general 
quality of life of a region.16 When manufacturing becomes organized on an interna- 
tional scale, these companies migrate abroad too. They compete with larger firms less 
by giganticism than by the formation of alliances of small players who join together 
to "behave as if they were big". The keyword becomes "connectivity": in a dispersed 
network organization, hierarchies are flatter, chains of command more fluid and func- 
tional sfructures more volatile. 
In the past, when we have thought "export" we had in mind the products of our 
primary industries (agriculture, fishing, forestry, mining) and our secondary industries 
(manufacturing). We conceived of "service industries" as domestic functions, not 
sources of export income. Yet in 1986, according to Birch, the United States export- 
ed no less than $145 billion worth of what he calls "thoughtware": high-tech and 
professional skills. Fortune Magazine (June 8,1987) states, in journalistic style, that 
it is the service industry, and not manufacturing or resource development, that "...will 
make the U.S. competitive again": revenues of overseas subsidiaries of advertising 
agencies, investment banks, insurers, consultants etc. alone accounted, in their estima- 
tion, for something in the order of $100 billion in 1983. Export of other services, ac- 
cording to the same source, probably reached the same figure. While I do not have 
comparable figures for Canada, I know that Canada is also active in the export of 
professional services, banking, engineering, scientific and management skills. 
This is a far cry from the vision we had of the new communication and informa- 
tion processing technologies as little as a decade ago.17 And far from the vision of the 
world being created by the new technologies projected the DOC discussion paper: more 
far-reaching than commercial databases, packaged software and value-added services 
for telephone subscribers, more fundamental than automation. I don't know if David 
Birch is right, or if the trend to globalization described by U.S. News & World Report, 
Business Week and Fortune Magazine is more than a journalistic pipe dream. But I 
feel that the evidence of atomization and globalization of the economy is all around 
-
us, and I find it distressing that a major discussion paper, which expresses the policy 
perspectives of the Canadian government, should be totally silent on a matter, which, 
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even if these people are half right, has to be the single most devastating consequence 
of the new communication technologies. 
Consider: what we once thought of as "soft", the things of the mind, are now- 
we have to sell, Sofr ware is just what it says--ideas for sale. Software is no longer 
just instructions for a computer, nor even a new kind of educational experience; 
software is our acquired professional and management skills, developed in a complex 
society, and translated through informatics into a marketable commodity, to be sold in 
countries who want to understand how we did those things. Those of us trained to be 
practical people of affairs in an earlier era find it hard to reconcile themselves to the 
idea that the techniques of some social scientist or the creative ideas of an artist might 
be easier to sell than wheat or cotton shirts; those of us who were trained to be the cus- 
todians of an intellectual and artistic tradition may find it equally hard to see oursel- 
ves transformed into today's version of shakes and shingles. But, like it or not, that 
seems to be about the size of it. The time when we led in hard-ware is behind us, 
migrated to the third world, the time of soft-ware just begun. 
The Challenge to Public Policy 
I am not trying here to take a position either for or against the commercialization 
of our intellectual life. That is a matter for public debate, a question which has no 
simple answer. What I find objectionable in the DOC discussion paper is the failure 
to examine the options which are now, realistically, open to us. There is no prospect 
of sustaining industrial sectors that we once thought inviolate in the face of mounting 
international competition for which we are ill prepared, even though it was stimulated 
by organizing activities of our own multinationals, other than by desperate measures 
of protectionism whose ultimate effect is to further reduce what remaining advantage 
we may have and soon degenerate into permanent disability allowances. Technologi- 
cal advances in communication have created an environment which favors new kinds 
of enterprise. We can decide to move into that environment or not, but no nation, cer- 
tainly not one of our size, can do much to determine what the rules of competition of 
the future will be. We are like someone who learned to play English rugby and now 
finds himself in the midst of a game of American football: we must either learn the 
new rules or find a way to extricate ourselves gracefully from the game. But what 
"extricate ourselves" could possibly mean, I for one cannot imagine. 
Here we face the dilemma of the new technologies. These technologies are not- 
the discussion paper to the contrary--the means by which we will recover our nation- 
al competitiveness in resource development, manufacturing and the delivery of health 
and education. Automation, and its supposed benefits in enhanced productivity, has 
turned out to be a chimera. Not that automation cannot be used to improve workers' 
performance, but rather that ifit should soprove its value then it still makes more sense, 
economically, to locate one's automated factory in one of those areas of the world 
where the local labor supply is abundant, motivated, skilled enough--and prepared to 
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enough--and prepared to work for less. In the century before ours, machinery was 
heavy, factories were immobile and it was labor that had to be relocated fiom one 
country to another (leading to the great wave of immigration into North America); 
nowadays, machinery has become lighter, and with automation, very much so, and it 
makes better economic sense to export the factory than to import the labor. It is no 
longer even just a question of "cheap" labor: the quality of workmanship to be had in 
the developing world has also become better.'' 
The truth of the matter is that the new communication technologies are middle- 
class technologies. They are not an autonomously intelligent substitute for cheap labor 
(the endlessly receding dream of artificial intelligence); they are extraordinary tools 
placed in the hands of literate, highly educated and creative individuals. The social 
consequences of that "bias" of these technologies are far from uniformly ennobling. 
Look again at those employment trends: a decline in the family farm, a decline in all 
those areas where worker security was the greatest (and unionization was a major fac- 
tor), an increase in the middleclass and professional sectors--but also an increase in 
sectors of the service industries characterized by minimum security, minimum wages 
and minimum opportunity for individual growth. It is in some sense a formula for a 
bi-polar society, where the well-to-do get better-dodo and the poor stay poor while 
the middle gets thinner. This is the prospect Communications for the twenty-first 
century never addresses. 
The Limits Of Bureaucratic Policy Making 
If we had hoped for a new vision of the next century we have, it seems, been de- 
ceived. Perhaps there is a reason. I have already alluded to the body of research deal- 
ing with the impact of the new technologies on organizational structure and practice. 
A finding of this research is the surprising conservatism of large organizations. Child, 
Gunter and ICieser,19 reporting on a six-nation study of the implementation of new 
technologies of information-processing and communication, sum up their conclusion 
as "little organizational change". Apart fiom external constraints, it turned out that 
how technology gets implemented is decided by the political realities of organization- 
al life. Among the main players are the technical departments whose jurisdiction over 
the high-tech budget is a source of considerable power, and a claim to legitimacy. Ac- 
cording to Child et al., the technical department is typically guided by an image--a 
"template", in the authors' words-defining what organizations are (and how technol- 
ogy fits into them), based on long-established principles of volume of production, 
reduction of unit costs, substitution of machinery (or low-wage labor) for highly- 
qualified (and hence scarce) labor--all the properties we associate with the era of 
manufacturing, which the statistics now tell us is in decline, domestically. This image, 
or "template", is inconsistent with a notion of organization based on highly- qualified 
professionals, translating their knowledge into saleable software, and using techno- 
logy to augment their own translation process, both in creating the software and in 
marketing it. By its indifference to the cultural dimension, it also ignores the 
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extraordinary interaction between the user and the technology, through which tech- 
nology is in fact recreated, and instead emphasizes an artificial separation between the 
technical part (the domain of the expert) and the user part (which is thought to be ir- 
relevant to the utilitarian definition of the task). The political process that surrounds 
the implementation of technology in the organization is based on the defense and ex- 
tension of organizational positions: if, as we have seen, technology keeps on being 
bought, that is a recognition of the entrenched power of the technology department; if 
its effect on actual organizational practice is minimal, that is because the user com- 
munity of professionals has an over-riding discretionary power to decide how its tasks 
will be carried out. The technology nevertheless becomes, as b e m e r  and ICing2' 
point out, a powerful tool for either facilitating structural changes determined for other 
reasons or more probably for reinforcing existing structures--" ... a powerful tool of the 
status quo". Technology policy thus becomes a pawn in the ongoing game of organi- 
zational politics, and a kind of index of the profile of power of the decisional hierar- 
chy. 
I find it impossible not to see in the recent DOC publication evidence of Child et 
a1.k "template". The department, having played for so long the role of missionary for 
the new technologies, before "high-tech" had entered the public consciousness, now 
risks being trapped in its own mythology, at a time when we need a more balanced 
view of what Dunais et al. call the "two-way" causality of technological change.21 The 
question is no longer just how technology transforms society; we need to also look at 
how society transforms technology. 
In intensely political environments such as Ottawa, questions of a general or- 
der-meta-questions--are not infrequently transformed into questions relating to the 
department's place in the bureaucracy. Questions of national policy come to be sub- 
sumed under the heading of de~artmental policy. Though it claims to be a contribu- 
tion to anational debate, in areal sense Communications for the twenty-first century 
may not have been written for a general audience at all. It is part of a process whose 
dynamic is fixed by the negotiated realities of bureaucratic influence. The Depart- 
ment of Communications has traditionally straddled the domains of economic policy 
(through research, telecommunications, new technology development) and of social 
policy (through broadcasting and culture). This divisiowso reminiscent of Snow's 
"two cultures"--has tended to support a stereotype: that technology is profitable, but 
only secondarily social (in that one must do a "needs" analysis, and something about 
"impact"), while culture is social but unprofitable. What now confronts the Depart- 
ment is the realization that technology without sociability is not profitable: it doesn't 
even work22 To judge from the paper that has been issued, it would seem that the 
problems of people still come out as an inconvenient sideeffect of technological 
change, rather than the only way to benefit from it. 
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I wish to acknowledge the support of the Institute for Research on Public Policy, 
in the form of a sabbatical scholarship, which has permitted the writing of this 
essay. I would also like to thank the University of California at Berkeley for its 
help. 
See, for example, Faulhaber, 1987 and Tunstall, 1986. 
I hope it is not necessary to point out that this is "value-added" commentary on 
the part of the present author, based on an assumption of the reality behind the 
paper, and not an indirect quote of the content of the paper. 
I must again emphasize that I am here interpreting the paper freely and not 
reproducing directly the material therein, which is impeccably discreet in its 
formulation throughout. I am again making some assumptions about the context 
within which the report is issued with which the authors of the report might well 
disagree. 
"'Big Brother Inc.' may be closer than you thought; The latest threat: Personal 
'profiles' compiled from the widening web of data bases," Business Week, 
February 9,1987. Closer to home, the Montreal Gazette of May 12,1987 reported 
that "hivate data banks leave Quebecers open to abuse"; among other things, the 
Quebec Justice Department sells information to the Montreal Credit Bureau, even 
before a verdict on a trial is reached. The New York Times (Markoff, 1988) reports 
that "...just about everyone is at risk." One man was arrested five times for crimes 
he did not commit (his birth certificate had been stolen); he had to sue to have his 
name removed from the F.B.I. database used widely by police forces. One 
commercial database, used by creditors (not marketed to the general public) has 
information on more than 138 million names in roughly 84 million households. 
The latest technique is computer matching, which involves merging different 
databases to create profiles on individuals; between 1980 and 1984, some 15 
American government agencies had matched more than 2 billion records. 
This issue has also received extensive treatment in the literatwe; perhaps the best 
known example being Heather Menzies (1981) Women and the Chip. 
I am indebted to Barry Lesser of Dalhousie University for this idea, which is 
developed in a paper for the Department of Communications on the regional 
implications of communications development. Naturally, Professor Lesser must 
be absolved of any responsibility for the version presented here. 
One of the most surprising lacks in the paper is the absence of any realistic 
discussion of research priorities: what should we be doing in research to keep 
abreast of purely technological developments in superconductivity. 
highdefinition television, parallel processing, arficial intelligence, and so on, 
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for the whole spectrum of current international research trends.? Considering that, 
even starved, the Department's resources are among the most important 
concentration of research skills in the country, this indifference to the setting of 
national priorities in technology development is regrettable. 
9. See the quotation in the next section, for an example of a "rhetorical flourish". 
10. See for example Chevalier, 198 1. 
11. Cf. Abraham and Shaw, 1984; Arun and Holder, 1986; Barnsley and Demko, 
1986; Fischer and Smith, 1981; Gleick, 1987; Mandelbrot, 1977; Pithnero and 
Tosatti, 1986; Shaw, 1984; Smale, 1980; Sparrow, 1982; Winfree, 1987. 
12. According to Keniche Ohmae (1987). the favorable Japanese balance of trade 
with the United States is explained by the operations of Americanawned 
companies in Japan: if one were to compute only the figures related to strictly 
Japanese companies, the ratio would be in favor of the United States! 
13. Birch, 1987. 
14. Communications for the twenty-first century quotes somewhat similar figures 
for Canada: between 1946 and 1986, the percentage employed in resources has 
gone from 29% to 7%. in manufacturing from 30% to 23%. in services from 41% 
to 71 %. In other words, in 1946, three people out of five were engaged in resource 
development, including agriculture, and manufacturing, only two in the service 
sector. Today, less than one in three (30%) labors in a sector which we have tended 
to think as "productive", while seven people out of ten are in the service category. 
Considered differently, it is estimated that about 45% of the labour force can be 
considered to be engaged in "information work, as defined by OECD, which 
breaks down by percentage as follows: 10% in the resources sector, 32% in 
manufacturing and 52% in the service sector. The apparent discrepancy between 
these figures and Birch's is accounted for by the difference in how administration 
is categorized (included under "services" in the DOC figures, not in Birch's); 
otherwise, they reveal identical trends in Canada and the U.S., as we would expect. 
Curiously, although the discussion paper asserts initially that "only by 
understanding the long-term nature and direction of change can we chart a course 
for the future" (by which it refers to the figures on changes in the economy and 
the work force which we have just cited), it never returns in subsequent sections 
to the theme. 
15. 1988 Ten-year Forecast, the Institute for the Future, Menlo Park California. 
16. IMB's decision to locate its 1500-person software opeliltions in the Toronto region 
illustrates the logic: excellent communications, a dense network of universities, 
outstanding quality of life, commercial "synergy", concentration of intellectual 
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activity. See Bertin's article in the Toronto Globe and mail, Monday, May 23, 
p.Bl3.. 
17. The indus~y  development exercises of the federal government, in the 
mid-seventies, ignored the whole software phenomenon. Where electronics and 
computing were concerned, they were lumped in with electrical products. 
Statistics Canada had, for years, no category by which to measure the growth of 
anything resembling "thoughtware". The products of intellectual effort seemed 
to the planners of the time too esoteric to be counted in a serious assessment of 
national industrial activity. 
18. See Lardner, 1988: for an analysis of the global restructuring of the garment 
industry, and it. impact on North American manufacturing. 
19. Child, J., Gunter, H-D and Kieser, A., 1987. 
20. Kraemer, K. L. and King, J. L., 1986. 
21. Dunais et al, 1988. 
22. When this was being written, the Montreal Gazette published an article entitled 
"Computer blues" (Bryan, 1988). What it recounts is that the "world's most 
profitable" bill-collection company experienced "plummeting" profits when it 
installed a "massive computerization program". The culprit the computer system 
which represents "...a ballooning expense." The company is confident that 
eventually they will benefit from computerization but at this point, 18 months 
behind schedule, they have become uncomfortably aware that their experience 
"...is one that, with small variations, has been played out in many other companies 
across North America." 
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